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To provide explanations is one of the essential goals of scientific research. Scientific 
explanations bear a close relation to at least two further scientific concepts equally im-
portant for the sciences, viz. causality and unification. On the one hand, explanations 
typically provide causes for their respective explanandum phenomena, and thus, also 
knowledge about how one can manipulate or control one’s environment in a way that 
serves one’s purposes. On the other hand, scientific explanations typically subsume a 
multitude of different events under a manageable amount of general principles, which, 
among other things, provides us with an understanding of the world we are living in. 
 In November 2011, we organized a workshop with the title Explanation, Causality, 
and Unification at the Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, which was funded by 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), research unit Causation / Laws / Disposi-
tions / Explanation (FOR 1063). The main goal of this workshop was to bring together 
experienced as well as young researchers with a specialization in one or more of the 
three topics mentioned in the workshop’s title to present and discuss their work as 
well as the connection between explanation, causality, and unification. But also issues 
concerning conceptual questions of the explication of these concepts, issues concer-
ning problems and results that arise from these concepts’ application to specific scien-
tific disciplines, and questions about how these concepts relate to other concepts rele-
vant to the sciences, such as expectation, law, reduction, etc., were of interest.  
 We are very happy to present a collection of five papers which resulted from 
presentations and critical discussions at the workshop, in the monographic section of 
this issue of THEORIA. The first paper (pp. 9-27) is Stathis Psillos’ “Regularities, Natu-
ral Patterns and Laws of Nature”. The paper starts by posing the question of why 
there is regularity in nature. The author argues that (contrary to what rationalists typi-
cally claim) no powers or necessary connections are required as enforcers of regularity. 
From an empiricist point of view regularity enforcers are not needed at all. As an al-
ternative, he sketches an empiricist metaphysics of robust and objective laws of nature 
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based on the notion of natural patterns, whose relation to regularities is then analyzed 
in mereological terms.  
 In “Scientific Practice and Necessary Connections”, which is the second paper (pp. 
29-39) in this collection, Andreas Hüttemann introduces a new problem for those 
Humeans who belief that the future is not yet determined. He argues that such “open-
future-Humeans” cannot explain what he calls the “recalcitrance of nature,” i.e., the 
fact that nature is such that any attempt to bring about certain situations, e.g., a viola-
tion of the Maxwell-equations, is doomed to failure. He then argues that the best 
available explanation for the “recalcitrance of nature” is not provided by an empiricist 
Humean metaphysics, but by a metaphysics that features necessary connections. 
 The third paper (pp. 41-56), “The Role of Unification in Micro-Explanations of 
Physical Laws” by Erik Weber and Merel Lefevere, focuses on the micro-explanation 
of physical laws. The authors introduce and discuss two specific examples of physical 
laws and their respective micro-explanations, viz. (i) the phenomenon that the mercu-
ry level first drops and then rises in mercury thermometers which are rapidly im-
mersed in hot water, and (ii) the ideal gas law. On the basis of these two examples and 
their findings, the authors argue that unification, though not a goal of explanation, is 
still an explanatory virtue, because unification typically results in higher explanatory 
power in the Woodwardian sense that explanations involving unification usually pro-
vide more answers to what-if-things-had-been-different questions. 
 In his “Unification and Explanation: Explanation as a Prototype Concept”, which 
is the fourth paper (pp. 57-70) in this monographic section, Gerhard Schurz investi-
gates unification as an explanatory virtue. After giving a brief sketch of the Schurz-
Lambert account of unification, the author critically discusses several objections to 
this account made by Weber and van Dyck, Gijsbers, and de Regt. As a last step, the 
author argues that causation, nomic expectability, and unification typically go hand in 
hand with explanation. But neither is it the case that a single one of these three con-
cepts is necessary, nor that all three together are sufficient for explanation. He con-
cludes that explanation should be understood as a prototype concept containing cau-
sation, nomic expectability, and unification. 
 The fifth and last paper (pp. 71-82) in this collection is Victor Gijsbers’s “Unifica-
tion as a Measure of Natural Classification”. The author is mostly interested in scien-
tific understanding without explanation. The paper starts by explaining Duhem’s no-
tion of natural classification, which seems to be a good candidate for providing some 
kind of non-explanatory understanding. Then five desiderata a measure for the natu-
ralness of classifications would have to meet are introduced and discussed. As a last 
step, the author argues that an amended version of the Schurz-Lambert account of 
unification fits these five desiderata, and thus, provides adequate means for a measure 
of the naturalness of classifications.  
 We would like to thank the researchers who gave a talk at the workshop, in par-
ticular, Michael Baumgartner, Lorenzo Casini, Victor Gijsbers, Andreas Hüttemann, 
Kevin Kelly, Theo Kuipers, Margaret Morrison, Stathis Psillos, Henk de Regt, Matti 
Sintonen, Erik Weber, and Jon Williamson, as well as the other attendees of the work-
shop whose valuable contributions to the general discussion made the event such a 
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success. Further thanks go to the authors who contributed to this special issue for 
their interesting work, to the reviewers for their helpful comments, and also to the 
THEORIA editors José Antonio Díez Calzada, Valeriano Iranzo, and David Teira for 
the pleasant collaboration and their support in editing this monographic section. 
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